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GOETHE AND PHILOSOPHY 
GREAT poem is by rights its own message and inter- A pretation, both: were it possible to translate it ade- 
quately into prose, the perfect paraphrase would prove the 
poem imperfect. And yet all great poetry is a message 
which we are bound to interpret. Whether we regard 
poetry as a criticism of life or  as its expression, surely all 
true poetic utterance is a response to a significant view of 
life. In  reading a great poem we share in a great vision 
in which nature may be disclosing her inmost soul, as it dis- 
closes its shell and outer vesture in an epoch-making scien- 
tific experiment. When Dante sings, in the last line of the 
Divine Comedy, of “The Love which moves the sun and the 
other stars”, he may in truth be quite as revealing as Newton 
or  Einstein. In the one case as in the other we should heed 
the Evangelist’s warning, “Understandest thou what thou 
readest?” So Dante again, with no mean estimate of his 
art ,  challenges our understanding : 
0 ye who have sound intellects, observe 
The doctrine that is here, hiding itself 
Beneath the veil of the unwonted verses! 
I shall not with nai’ve conceit propose in this single hour’s 
discourse to  tell Goethe’s secret, lest you with unkind accu- 
racy conclude that I have loyally kept the secret. My task 
is a more modest survey, and still too taxing I fear. I have 
sought t o  suggest it in the title I have chosen: not “The 
Philosophy of Goethe”, nor even “The Philosophy in 
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Goethe”, nor yet merely “Goethe and the Philosophers”, 
but rather something of all these three together: so I have 
called it “Goethe and Philosophy”, a topic half-biograph- 
ical, half-analytic and interpretative, and not too gossipy 
withal. I n  brief, this is our question today: Wha t  is Goethe’s 
view of nature and of human nature as we find it developed 
and expressed in his works? And furthermore, what are 
Goethe’s philosophical kinships, and how does he take his 
rank and stand with the great thinkers of the past? 
Goethe himself disclaimed any attachment to technical 
philosophy. H e  has thought, he tells us, but he has not 
spent his time thinking about thought: he has kept free from 
philosophical entanglements. W e  should not be misled by 
such words, nor yet by the scorn which Goethe’s Mephis- 
topheles pours on logic and metaphysics : 
Truly  the fabric of mental fleece 
Resembles a weaver’s masterpiece, 
Where  a thousand threads one treadle throws, 
Where  fly the shuttles hither and thither, 
Unseen the threads are  knit together, 
And an infinite combination grows. 
Then ,  the philosopher steps in  
And shows, no otherwise it could have been: 
T h e  first was  so, the second so, 
Therefore  the third and fourth are so ;  
W e r e  not the first and second, then 
T h e  third and fourth had never been. 
T h e  scholars are  everywhere believers, 
But never succeed in being weavers. 
Goethe disdained pedantry of whatever sort, and the philo- 
sophical pedant impressed him as hopelessly arid. “What  
should the English and French think of the language of our 
philosophers, when we Germans ourselves cannot under- 
stand i t?” And again he says : “Before I write a syllable on 
metaphysics, I must first better settle my physics.” But he 
did not on that account disdain or dismiss real philosophy, 
Without scholastic or  pedantic commitments, we find him 
Goethe and Philosophy 63 
articulating a philosophy of life for which he claims the 
prime merit of naturalness, of sanity. 
Goethe’s view of life is original, not in that i t  is novel 
but in that it is thoroughly his own. I t  is not a par t  of his 
learning but of his experience. Thus he responds to  other 
thinkers, assimilating or rejecting, but always remains him- 
self, and the direction is his own. T h e  dominant idea, aim, 
and touchstone of Goethe’s thinking is his deep conviction 
of a living principle in nature, in the world without and 
in humanity. Goethe awoke very early to this sense of the 
vital unity of nature, and he never lost it. Even while still 
a child, believing in the God of his fathers, he yet sought to  
reach H i m  more directly through nature-sometimes in 
curious ways. Once he made an altar of a red-lacquered 
music-stand with a four-sided top like a pyramid; loaded 
it sacrificially with products of nature and set some incense 
aflame with a burning-glass a t  sunrise. This  was his offer- 
ing to the great nameless Spirit of Nature. T h e  second 
time he tried it, however, his flame spread to the lacquered 
stand, and the boy did not venture further in his career as 
nature-priest. But his apotheosis of nature persisted as he 
grew up and, while his imagination was ravished by the 
Greek naturalistic pantheon and his conscience felt the need 
of moral response to  a supreme personal deity, his intellect 
sought unity in all nature, and that unity living and divine. 
So lat,er in life he wrote to  Jacobi: “AS a poet and artist I 
am polytheistic, as a naturalist I am pantheistic, and I am 
the one as decidedly as the other. Did I need a God for my 
personality, as a moral being, I should already be provided 
therewith.” These are not incompatible views in his mind; 
they suggest rather the vast range of nature: her infinite 
variety, her all-pervading unity, and her divine responsive- 
ness-all natural. 
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But it was chiefly the idea of the living, all-pervading 
unity of nature which possessed Goethe’s mind. The  vision 
of this unity as divine and perfect gave it a religious char- 
acter. H e  could not tolerate the idea of a transcendent deity 
alien to the world: 
W h a t  were a God, who from the outside stirred 
So that the world around his finger whirred? 
H e  from within the universe must move, 
Nature in him, and him in nature prove. 
T h u s  all that lives and moves within his bliss 
Will ne’er his power and ne’er his spirit miss. 
This  cosmotheism is reflected also in Goethe’s scientific 
thinking. His  ideas of the metamorphosis of plants and 
animals: his notion of all plants as originally evolved out 
of one primal plant-form, of a living, directing activity in 
nature, not supernatural but itself nature’s own process : 
these are but instances of his pantheistic naturalism. I t  ex- 
presses itself in rhapsodic nature-hymns, hylozoistic and 
almost mystical. Jakob Boehme, the German mystic of the 
Renaissance, had spoken of nature as “the book of God” 
and had said that in a meadow “one could see, smell, and 
taste God’s power.” To Goethe also nature is a living 
book, and he is convinced that he can read i t :  “Nature 1 We 
are encompassed and enfolded by her-incapable of emerg- 
ing from her, and incapable of immersing ourselves more 
deeply in her. Unbidden and unwarned she picks us up in 
her whirling dance and sweeps us along until we drop, ex- 
hausted, in her arms. . . . She is ever changing and there 
is not a moment’s pause in her. . . . H e r  pace is measured; 
her exceptions rare, her laws unalterable. . . . T h e  un- 
natural itself is Nature. . . . Whatsoever is true and what- 
soever is false, she has uttered it. All is her blame, all is her 
merit.” As the life and spirit of a living being that is not 
superimposed upon its many members but permeates each 
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part, so is nature’s unity. Nature is not a sum nor a heap; 
it is not fragmentary, but integral in each par t :  
Nature no kernel has, nor shell, 
Her all in every part doth dwell. 
T o  such a pantheist the fashionable French materialism 
of the day was unthinkable. Fo r  the emancipating work of 
the French Enlightenment, Goethe had words of high 
praise, and for  Voltaire in particular; but the crass mate- 
rialism in which it ended, impressed him as sterile. In  his 
Dichtung und W a h r h e i t  he writes of Holbach’s System of 
Nature,  the so-called Bible of eighteenth-century material- 
ism: how it  repelled him so that he could not comprehend 
its ruinous appeal t o  other minds. H e  rejected it, alien to  
his spirit-this account of the world in terms of mere matter 
and motion, frictions, contacts, collisions, masses and dis- 
solution of masses, nothing more! “I t  seemed to us so 
gray, Cimmerian, so deadly.” In this resistance to what was 
spiritually dull in the French Enlightenment, Goethe took 
his rank with the men who were championing another, more 
humane ideal. T h e  violent romantic rebellion of Storm and 
Stress certainly stirred the young Goethe; the longing for  
untrammeled freedom, the cult of the titanic, the impa- 
tience with any formal bonds, the disdain for tradition. But 
Goethe’s ever-reliable sanity and saving-grace of humor 
were bound to  lead him to that aspiring but serene activity 
which became increasingly characteristic of him as he 
matured. 
With Herder,  above all, Goethe was gaining a historical 
sense and the deep cultural insight that  comes from alert 
tolerance. T o  Herder  reality was history : culture, language, 
religion, institutions were the pulses and the pillars of the 
world. Goethe had too lively a sense for  physical nature 
ever t o  go the whole way with Herder,  but Herder’s devout 
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humanism reinforced his own opposition to shallow mecha- 
nistic accounts of the world. T h a t  you can devise and test 
accurate mechanistic formulas of nature need not mean that 
you have really perceived the range and depth of its being. 
It may only show how much abstraction has been required 
to encase nature in a formula. You have squeezed the 
orange dry and so you have a precise disclosure of its sec- 
tors and joints and inner geometry. Goethe did not really 
need Herder  to reveal nature to him as the matrix and the 
living scene of spirit; but Herder  led him to  perceive the 
reach and the roots of the spiritual realm, its order and its 
onward movement through history. So Goethe was enabled 
to go beyond Herder,  to achieve a synthesis of Herder’s 
humanism and of what passed for  naturalism in the eight- 
eenth century. 
In this synthesis material nature was not merely material, 
nor mind a mere ripple or stirring episode in the Dead Sea 
of matter. But while firmly resisting the materialist, Goethe 
found equally unconvincing and uncongenial all philosophers 
who sought to find reality above nature and sat  as it were 
in judgment on nature. So, against the uncomprehending 
view of nature from without and the arrogant-condescend- 
ing view of it from above, Goethe saw a really true view of 
it from within, a view of nature entire and living. Ancient 
hylozoism, the conception of the whole material world as 
alive, engaged his imagination but was too nai’ve to hold his 
intellect. I t  was not until he came to Spinoza that Goethe 
found a kindred philosophy. I t  is interesting to observe that 
this year in which we commemorate the centenary of 
Goethe’s death marks likewise the tercentenary of his philo- 
sophical master, for  Baruch de Spinoza was born in Amster- 
dam just three hundred years ago, in 1632, the same year 
in which also John Locke, the leader of British empiricism, 
first saw the light of day. 
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Goethe’s own mind was thoroughly prepared in attitude 
for  Spinoza’s monism. First  introduced to it indirectly by 
a hostile criticism he had read and by the poor article in 
Bayle’s Dictionary, Goethe was led in his twenties to 
Spinoza’s own works and as a result found an acknowledged 
master. Late in life he told Eckermann “how well the views 
of this great thinker met the needs of his youth. H e  found 
in Spinoza his own self, and so could attach himself to the 
finest in Spinoza.” This  attachment was no passing devotion. 
In  1812 the sixty-three year old Goethe writes in his diary 
that for  weeks on end Spinoza’s Ethics had been his daily 
reading, It was his consolation, he said: “When I feel trou- 
bled I return to the Ethics.” 
W h a t  then did the young Goethe find in Spinoza? No 
one has answered this better than himself: “I found in the 
Ethics a sedative for  my passions, and it seemed to unveiI 
a clear, broad view over the material and moral world. But 
what especially riveted me to him was the boundless disin- 
terestedness which shone forth in every sentence. T h a t  
wonderful sentiment, ‘He  who truly loves God must not 
require God to love him in return’, together with all the 
preliminary propositions on which it rests, and the conse- 
quences deduced from it, filled my mind. T o  be disinterested 
in everything, but most of all in love and friendship, was 
my highest desire, my maxim, my practice, so that saucy 
speech of Philine’s, ‘If I love thee, what is that  to thee?’ 
was spoken right out of my heart. Moreover it must not be 
forgotten here that the closest unions rest on contrasts. 
T h e  all-equalizing calmness of Spinoza was in striking con- 
trast  with my all-disturbing activity; his mathematical 
method was the direct opposite of my poetic style of thought 
and feeling, and that very precision which was thought ill 
adapted to moral subjects made me his enthusiastic disciple, 
his most decided worshipper. Mind and heart, understand- 
68 Goethe Centenary Lectures 
ing and sense, sought each other with eager affinity, binding 
together the most different natures.” 
Spinoza looked a t  the world as a unitary, infinite, eternal, 
self-determined Substance. Infinite in essence, it must have 
an infinitude of attributes or essential aspects, such as the 
two which we recognize, matter and mind. Reality is both 
extended and thinking; matter and mind are as it were two 
different versions of one world-order, therefore independent 
of each other but thoroughly parallel and corresponding to 
each other. All that  exists is a state or  modification of the 
one Reality; the ultimate ground, the t ap roo t  of all things 
is one. Look a t  the world on the surface only and you see 
multiplicity, waywardness, disorder ; but see deeper into the 
heart  of things and you will perceive in them all the mani- 
festation of the one ultimate Reality. T h e  waves are all in 
and of the one ocean. This  ocean of all being you may call 
God, or you may call it Nature : the two terms were synony- 
mous to Spinoza. Reality then is not in the random particu- 
lar, nor is it in some divine, transcendent Being, but things 
are real-in-God. Their true being is in Nature, and this in- 
tegral being of them all is the true nature of each of them. 
They are what they are ultimately in God, and their nature 
is thus eternally determined. There is no waywardness in 
God and there can be none in the world in detail. This  our 
intelligence may perceive; in recognition of the eternal 
world-order we are led from confused petulance to the 
serene clarity of reason. Infatuate upstart passion springs 
from confused perspective ; as we understand a passion and 
see it in its place, as  we learn to  see things in relation, in 
their true nature, in their cosmic context, o r  as Spinoza 
puts it, under the pattern of eternity, our whole thought 
becomes possessed by the sense of the perfect Ultimate 
in which all things are. This  serene yet exalted perfection 
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of rational insight Spinoza calls the intellectual love of 
God. 
I t  was the idea of the perfect unity of this divine, deter- 
mined order pervading all things which impressed Goethe. 
But he did not master all of Spinoza’s apparatus, nor did 
he follow his master the whole way. T o  feel himself one 
with Mother Nature  was a sublime experience, but Goethe 
insisted on feeling himself one. Spinoza’s mind was filled 
with the divine Nature in which all things a re ;  Goethe’s 
mind contemplated poetically the perfection of all things 
that  are thus one in the divine Nature. It was an important 
difference. As Gundolf has well expressed it, “What  sepa- 
rated him from Spinoza was just his poetic sensibility, which 
worshipped the divine presence not only as the mathematical 
Spinoza worshipped it, in the laws of the universe, but in 
its forms and forces; his pantheism, unlike Spinoza’s, was 
not mechanistic but vitalistic; God-Nature to  him was not 
rational law, but visible, palpable, plastic figures.” 
This  more poetic, or shall I say more dramatic, Spinozism 
of Goethe leads him to further divergence from his philo- 
sophical master. Goethe’s pantheism is dramatic. I t  is not 
only the monism of the all-embracing world-order, but i t  is 
also or  rather the monism of the all-pervading, self-reveal- 
ing divine activity. It is the drama of nature in which all 
things are evolving and perfecting their respective r6les. 
So, it seems clear, Goethe was bound in his maturer think- 
ing, while never losing his loyalty to Spinoza, to  revise his 
master’s doctrine radically, so as to gratify his keen poetic 
sense of the characters, the rales, the living action of the 
drama of reality. Spinoza had been content to exhibit its 
unity, its order, its inevitable perfection. Goethe’s philoso- 
phy is thus a Spinozism pulsating with life and concrete 
character. 
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It is evident, in terms of technical philosophical procedure, 
that  here we have a movement from Spinoza, if not to, then 
toward Leibniz. Lessing, as Bielschowsky has pointed out, 
setting out from Leibniz, found his refuge and destiny in 
Spinoza’s monism. Goethe, on the contrary, reached after 
a philosophical vindication of living individuality which 
nevertheless should not disrupt the organic unity of nature. 
So he turned to Leibniz’ monads, or rather as he preferred 
to call them by an Aristotelian name, entelechies. T h e  
monads, the entelechies, are powers whose essence is activity 
and which are accordingly eternal. So Goethe does not de- 
preciate finite personality but demands an immortal destiny 
for  it. If my essence is in and of the universe, and this 
essence is characteristic ceaseless activity, then my extinc- 
tion is ruled out;  nature exacts that to which I aspire: my 
eternal unique r6le in the drama of reality. Speaking to Falk 
on his way back from Wieland’s funeral, Goethe reasons: 
“All monads are by nature so indestructible that they can- 
not stop or  lose their activity a t  the moment of their dissolu- 
tion, but must continue it in the very same moment. Thus 
they only part  from their old relations in order t o  enter a t  
once into new ones. In  this change all depends on the power 
of intention which resides in this o r  that monad.” And 
again, later in his life in a conversation with Eckermann: 
“The conviction of our survival arises in me from the idea 
of activity; for  if I am tirelessly active all my life, then 
Nature is in duty bound to assign me another form of ex- 
istence, when the present one can no longer hold out for my 
spirit.” Here the expression “in duty bound” should not 
mislead us. Goethe does not, like Kant, advocate a purely 
ethical view of immortality; his conclusion is a corollary 
from his natural science: the soul is essentially active and 
thus inextinguishable. Poetically expressed, an entelechy is 
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a distinctive actor in the drama of existence, and so cannot 
be spared: the continuance of the drama requires this indi- 
vidual participation. “I do not doubt our survival, fo r  
Nature cannot spare the entelechy.” T o  have a hereafter, 
however, one must be active here; one must have a d e .  
“ T o  manifest oneself as a great entelechy in the hereafter, 
one must, of course, be one.” Goethe would doubtless have 
seconded Browning, o r  rather Browning shared Goethe’s 
idea: as, for  instance, in A Toccata of Galuppi’s: 
T h e  soul, doubtless, is immortal-where a soul can be discerned. 
Thus Goethe’s thought matured and found expression, to 
be sure not in isolation from the philosophical currents of 
his time, but yet without technical partisanship or  systematic 
give-and-take. Jacobi’s critical reaction stimulated Goethe 
to a more careful study of Spinoza, and on this account as 
well as on account of his friendship, Goethe’s debt to him 
was very real; but Jacobi sought in vain to draw the poet 
into his own controversies over Lessing’s Spinozism. T o  
use Spinoza as a yeast for  his own thinking was one thing; 
t o  engage in scholastic arguments over Spinoza’s metaphys- 
ics, another. Goethe lived in the most intimate responsive- 
ness to the life and spirit of his time, but he was not afflicted 
with what might be called intellectual journalism : that  men- 
tal preoccupation with the factional polemics of the day 
which makes so much alleged philosophical writing little 
more than “occasional prose.” 
This  freedom from intellectual partisanship was a part  
of Goethe’s Olympian spirit. I t  may serve to explain his 
relation to his greatest contemporary. T h e  year 1781, 
notable in the history of modern thought, marked the death 
of Lessing and the publication of the Critique of Pure Rea- 
son. T w o  years later Kant published his Prolegomena to 
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Any Future Metaphysics. T h e  revision of the Critique in 
its second edition, in 1787, already indicated the wide re- 
sponse and critical reaction it had aroused in Germany. 
Goethe does not seem to have sensed the epoch-making sig- 
nificance of that decade. While Germany was learning and 
discussing Kant, Goethe was re-reading his Spinoza and 
was steeping himself in the spirit of classical antiquity on 
his Italian trip. Kant’s ethics, the Critique of Practical Rea- 
son, appeared in 1788, the year of Goethe’s return from 
Italy to Weimar, and two years later Kant’s aesthetics, the 
Critique of Judgment. All Germany was reading, thinking, 
teaching, disputing Kant, but, in spite of Jacobi’s urging, 
Goethe had read but little of the Critical philosophy. I t  
was really Schiller who first stimulated his serious interest 
in Kant. T o  do full justice to Schiller’s intimate relation to 
Goethe, so important in the spiritual career of both men, 
demands more manifold attention than could be given to i t  
in an essay dealing mainly with Goethe’s relation to philoso- 
phy. It should not be understood that Schiller encouraged 
Goethe to read Kant : on the contrary, Schiller did not think 
that Kant could give him, Goethe, anything, and told him 
so. But Schiller himself was absorbed in Kantian studies, 
and Goethe’s intimacy with Schiller made his participation 
in Schiller’s own Kantian interests natural. T h e  attitude of 
the two men towards Kant was very different. Schiller, as 
Lewes puts it, had really “hampered his genius by fixing 
on his Pegasus the leaden wings of Kant’s philosophy.” 
Goethe, as we have seen already, had the sources of his 
philosophy in himself. H e  did not go to Kant to find him- 
self, but rather, Ludwig says, “in order to go out of him- 
self, which he could do the more readily, as his nature, like 
scattered droplets of quicksilver, directly and easily united 
again.” H e  read Kant’s Critiques with no thought of taking 
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sides, but only anxious to see what Kant might have con- 
genial to him. Goethe’s studies, as his passions, were means 
to an ever fuller and more mature poetic utterance. 
T h a t  real knowledge was neither in passive reception of 
sense-impressions from without, nor yet in purely rational 
notions, excogitated and as it were dictated to nature, was 
as clear to Goethe as to Kant, and in this critical reaction to 
both the empiricism and the rationalism of the Enlighten- 
ment, the two were one. I do  not mean to say that Goethe 
had articulated this truth in his intellect, much less given it 
adequate statement-that was Kant’s work; but it was just 
such an idea as was bound to arouse a kindred response 
from Goethe. “Thoughts without content are empty; per- 
ceptions without conceptions are blind.” Sensation supplies 
the initial stuff of what we come to  know, but knowledge 
is not the mere result of our sense-experience of nature: it 
is the understanding which makes nature possible. This  
Kantian insistence on the mind’s integrity with nature in 
the subject-object world of experience was in line with 
Goethe’s fundamental turn of thought. 
But there was also a certain basic dualism in Kant’s sys- 
tem which was bound to meet with a vigorous resistance 
from Goethe. Kant proceeded, in his account of the nature 
and genesis of experience, to advocate a doctrine of critical 
limitation. Knowledge was in and of experience : while there 
were no assignable limits to the world of experience-spa- 
tial, temporal, o r  causal-yet we know and can know only 
phenomena, things experienced ; the things in themselves 
are beyond our reach. ‘The world of our knowledge is the 
causally connected world in space and time. As knowing 
minds we are involved in this causal space-time nexus and 
cannot transcend the world of experience in detail so as to 
contemplate i t  in its totality. T h e  transcendental ideas of 
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the Soul, the World-totality, God:  these our reason may 
entertain as notions, but cannot validate. 
While God, Freedom, and Immortality do not admit of 
theoretical proof, Kant nevertheless declares them in his 
ethics to be sovereign postulates of Practical Reason. 
Morality involves dutiful respect for  categorical impera- 
tives; i t  thus discloses man’s character as passing beyond 
the merely physical. In  his devotion to virtue man is en- 
gaged in an enterprise where both the achi,evement of his 
goal and its just recognition in the Realm of Ends demand 
immortal scope for his ideal activity and also God as uni- 
versal Judge of Worth and Exemplar of Perfection. 
There were thus in Kant a sceptical strain and also a new 
supernaturalism, or  rather a new cleavage between the 
world of nature and the supreme ideals. Goethe opposed 
them both. God, World, Soul were no mere notions to him 
as they were in Kant’s “Transcendental Dialectic.” T h e  
World, Nature in its integral entirety, was more real to him 
than any detailed item of existence. H e  might be astray re- 
garding the particular, but the Whole was indubitable to 
him, Nature supremely real and divine, the cosmos of active 
souls. Kant’s great antithesis-of necessity and freedom, 
empirical and intelligible character, physical nature and 
Realm of Ends-could not be the final word of the Critical 
philosophy. Goethe saw that it served rather as a challenge 
to Kant’s successors. Spirit and nature could not thus only 
be counterpoised : unless they were integrated in a higher 
synthesis, one o r  the other must prevail, in a one-sided phi- 
losophy. 
And this synthesis, if attained, must be attained ration- 
ally and not merely by dogmatic or  mystical fiat. Goethe 
writes in 1801 to Jacobi, who had been impressed precisely 
by the sceptical or rather phenomenological note in Kant’s 
Goethe and Philosophy 75 
philosophy: “HOW I stand toward philosophy, you can 
easily conceive. When it is preeminently bent on separating, 
I cannot get on with it, and can indeed say that i t  has often 
hurt  me, in that it has disturbed me in my natural course. 
But when it unites, or  rather, when it heightens and ensures 
our native sense of oneness with Nature, and transforms it 
into a deep, serene view, in whose everlasting union and 
separation we feel a divine life, . . . then I welcome it.” 
Goethe was a poet, but he did not on that account exalt 
mystical feeling in philosophy. H e  would not follow the 
lure of Jacobi, who tried to cherish in his heart the pious 
treasuries which he thought that  his understanding rejected. 
Unlike Schiller’s interpretation of Kant, Goethe could not 
accept the world of nature as mere appearance, from which 
he would have to rise to the world of values in order to 
reach reality in its true essence. 
Fichte’s exaltation of spirit a t  the expense of matter re- 
pelled Goethe as unnatural. Goethe’s early interest in 
Fichte, whom he called to  a professorship a t  Jena, was real, 
and they shared some very important ideas. Fichte’s cham- 
pionship of unremitting endeavor as essential t o  the moral 
ideal was bound to appeal to Goethe; indeed it has been 
pointed out that  this central idea in Faust was attained 
under Fichtean influence. But Goethe found Fichte’s aus- 
terity distasteful, and even more Fichte’s depreciation of 
a r t  and his imperious virtues, and most of all his haughty 
dismissal of nature as a mere sounding-board for the Fich- 
tean ego. H e r e  were two different philosophical tempera- 
ments in spite of real similarities in ideas. Still Goethe 
would do  him justice : after the satire on the young Fichteans 
in the scene of Mephistopheles and the Bachelor of Arts 
in the Second Pa r t  of Faust, the devil concludes on a toler- 
ant note : 
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The must may foam absurdly in the barrel, 
But still it turns at last to wine. 
Schelling seemed to Goethe to  be nearer the right path, 
or a t  any rate, Schelling was seeking the right path-to 
nature creative, living and entire, in which spirit was to  be 
a t  home. But while Goethe was attracted by Schelling’s por- 
trayal of living, developing nature, he came to distrust the 
unrestraint of Schelling’s philosophic imagination. Goethe 
was a philosophical poet ; Schelling a poetical philosopher : 
an important difference. 
Hegel’s dialectic was not likely to attract a mind like 
Goethe’s, but, as he came to know Hegel better, Goethe 
found him not alien but bending toward a similar goal, the 
active synthesis of spirit and nature. Goethe and Hegel 
shared the resistance to the romantic cult of pure, irre- 
sponsible feeling; in both is the Spinozistic exaltation of the 
unity of rational activity integrating intellmection and senti- 
ment;  both reveal the profound influence of Herder  and 
Lessing in the possession of a genuine historical sense, the 
sense of a world-process of significant on-going and fertile 
activity; of life not merely as movement but as a real jour- 
ney, a quest, though an ever-expanding one ; and a historical 
sense likewise of civilization, not as a dull random course 
of nameless masses nor as a romantic career of single heroes, 
but as genuine civilization : essentially social and multi- 
tudinous, yet engaging individuals in genuine personal ac- 
tivity: ever more real persons in an ever more real society. 
Hegel has been called by Berthelot the Goethe of philoso- 
phy. H e  sought to formulate in reasoned terms the con- 
viction which Goethe’s poetry uttered in the language of 
direct and intimate experience : the conviction of spirit as 
a t  home in nature, sap and fruition of the living tree of 
nature. 
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T o  Goethe this demand for  living unity is no mere sys- 
tematic exaction but a deep expression of his whole being, 
which he finds vindicated everywhere. T h e  two-lobed leaf 
of the oriental gingo tree transplanted in his Weimar garden 
was to him a symbol of his own inmost life: 
Do you not feel it in my poems, 
Twofold and yet one am I !  
“Twofold and yet one!” is just the point: the world dis- 
closes not bare identity of parts nor yet random and irre- 
ducible differences, but rather the living organic unity of 
diverse parts and elements. This  entire philosophical prob- 
lem, and also its solution, Goethe has stated in two packed 
lines : 
T o  reach unto the infinite, 
Distinguish first, but then unite ! 
Kant had done the former, the distinguishing, straight- 
forwardly, and while he had not achieved the synthesis, he 
had emphasized the demand for  it and ruled out some pre- 
tended solutions. Kant had beaten off interloping spiritu- 
ality in nature under the guise of teleology and final causes, 
and on the other hand he had exposed the spurious systems 
of morality, hedonistic and sentimental. Kant had thus im- 
posed the demand for  a real synthesis. Goethe felt that  he 
through his own nature pursued a similar course to Kant’s. 
Especially did Goethe value Kant’s aesthetics, not because 
of its detailed technical perfection o r  even adequacy, but 
because of the profound insight of its central idea. Just as 
Kant recognizes no final causes in nature, so likewise he ad- 
mits no ulterior purpose in art. In the work of a r t  the word 
has become flesh; the idea has gained sensible form and sub- 
stance, and in the perfection of this embodiment has found 
its full self-realization. But this naturalness of a r t  suggests 
to Goethe, if not an aesthetic view of all nature, a t  any rate 
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a sense of kinship between the two realms of spirit and 
nature. “A work of a r t  should b,e treated as a work of na- 
ture, and a work of nature as a work of a r t ;  the worth of 
each self-evolved and immanent in itself.” T h e  great artist 
literally “holds the mirror to nature”: in both nature and 
a r t  the whole is living in each par t ;  the idea is sensibly ap- 
parent;  nature utters spirit. 
W a s  this a deeper truth in Kant which Goethe already 
possessed, and did Schiller’s words, that  Kant had nothing 
to give to Goethe, mean, as Kuhnemann understands them: 
Goethe did not need Kant’s philosophy for he already had 
i t  and lived it? Was  this the further function of art, to  
reveal to us nature herself as the cosmic artist, uttering her 
meaning in living forms from the lowest types of being 
clear up to man? And did not Kant find man’s direct knowl- 
edge of the absolutely real in his recognition of the moral 
law, the categorical imperative? Virtue, the life of duty, 
is not merely a means to something ulterior, but is its own 
justification ; man’s own self-perfecting is the highest Ought;  
the achievement of personality, itself the supreme fruition 
of nature, is our supreme duty. 
As moral agents we are free. W e  are not masters of what 
takes place o r  of what befalls us, but masters we can be 
and are of what each event in our life means to us. There is 
thus necessity in the event; Spinoza’s determination is here 
incontestable; but the worth of the event is determined by 
our will’s championship or  rejection of it, in dutiful devo- 
tion to the moral ideal. So Siebeck points out the tragic 
instance of this in Faust: Gretchen’s attitude while in 
prison. “The chain of circumstances has involved her in 
love, in sin; but the resolution to  entrust her final fate to 
God’s justice, whereby she is redeemed not only in appear- 
ance but really, springs out of the most personal depths of 
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her noble nature.” To  Goethe, unlike Kant, this view of 
freedom does not imply a supersensible realm, but rather 
reveals the incapacity of mere mechanism to do justice to  
the living reality of nature in all its vast range. Here  again 
the difference between Goethe and Schiller is evident: 
Schiller, and Kant also, depreciate the sensible to  exalt the 
spiritual and noumenal; Goethe resists this Christian tend- 
ency and, in a more pagan spirit of naturalism, views the 
sensuous, the moral, and the aesthetic as all integral in the 
normal fruition of man, the full harmony of his being. 
So here is a philosophy that reads into Kant as it had read 
into or  out of Spinoza, what itself demands and recognizes 
in man’s spirit and in nature. Reality reveals the same fun- 
damental character in living nature and in all true works of 
a r t  and in the life of moral endeavor. These are but various 
versions of the one drama of nature. One should not in 
wholesale vagueness neglect the unique r6les of the char- 
acters in this drama, nor again should one seek the meaning 
of the drama beyond itself, that  is, beyond nature. I t  is its 
own justification; its divinity is immanent; its beauty inher- 
ent;  its virtue, in the dutiful activity itself. 
Le t  us not, however, mistake this philosophy for a placid 
cult of nature. As in her own creation, so in ar t ,  so in moral 
effort, nature is inexhaustible. T h e  perfect achievement of 
personality is an eternal task. In this sense, following 
Goethe’s dramatic monism, we may now say, “The play is 
the thing,” but as we say it, we recognize the tragic dignity 
that our life thus reveals. Fo r  Nature is inexhaustible, and 
a r t  is long, and the moral enterprise never completely 
achieved. Already in 1774 the twenty-five year old Goethe, 
exalted by the sense of the nobility of tragic endeavor, had 
flung his challenge to  the notion of infinite divine placidity, 
in his great poem Prometheus: 
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So didst thou think, 
I should weary of life, 
And fly to the desert, 
Because not all 
Blossoming dreams ripen? 
Here sit I and fashion 
Men in my image, 
A race to be like me, 
T o  suffer, to weep, 
T o  enjoy and rejoice, 
A11 disdainful of these. 
As I !  
W e  may follow the lead of Faust: “In the beginning was 
the Act.” In  the beginning and all the way through: is not 
this the central thought of Goethe’s masterwork? I t  is not 
the having achieved, i t  is the achieving that  matters. Less- 
ing’s noble words come to mind: “Did the Almighty, hold- 
ing in his right hand Truth,  and in his left Search after 
Truth,  deign to  tender me the one I might prefer-in all 
humility, but without hesitation, I should request-Search 
after Truth.” This  finality of truth Goethe realized, that  
real truth was beyond finality and inexhaustible, that  only 
in eternal perfectibility is real perfection of truth o r  of any 
other value. This is the conviction of the dying Faust : 
Yes! to this thought I hold with firm persistence, 
T h e  last result of wisdom stamps it true: 
He only earns his freedom and existence 
Who daily conquers them anew. 
There is a great passage in Wilhelnz Meister, which has 
been suggested by Siebeck as a motto for  Faust: “Man is 
blessed only as by his own boundless striving he sets his own 
limits.” 
So Goethe teaches us, as I have tried to interpret him 
elsewherel: “The worth of human life, as Faust comes to 
know it, is not in fervid enjoyment nor yet in thrilled or 
placid contemplation of past attainment, but in noble en- 
‘In the chapter “The Devil in Modern Poetry,” in The Nnture of E d  
(New York, Macmillan, 1931). 
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deavor and high hazard. . . . Only this perception of the 
eternal worth of high endeavor can exalt the fleeting mo- 
ment and seal it with eternal worth . . . an ideal forever 
real because never completely attained, and a grace forever 
blessing because never quite deserved.” H e r e  is the mystery 
and the marvel of the spiritual life: man reveals his limits 
but also his self-transcendence in aspiration. M a n  does not 
stake his fate on the external event, nor yet disdain it in its 
worship of some Supernature: but the event itself is preg- 
nant with its own vaster meaning, ennobled and exalted by 
its own Beyond. So the Mystical Choir sings a t  the close 
of Faus t :  
T h e  unattainable 
Here grows to event. . . . 
This sense, humble yet exalting, of the inexhaustible per- 
fection with which we are yet one in principle : is not this the 
essence of piety and likewise the dynamic of all creative 
achievement? So Goethe declared: “Only religious men can 
be creative.” And so again in his poem on T h e  D i v i n e :  
Hail to the unknown 
Higher presences 
Whom we divine: 
May man be like them, 
And his acts teach us 
T o  meet them in faith. . , . 
But man can accomplish,- 
Man alone,-the impossible; 
He discriminates, 
Chooses and judges ; 
T o  the fleeting moment 
He gives duration. 
So again a t  the end of Iphigenia in Taur i s :  Thoas hesitates 
before the noble decision. Iphigenia urges him : 
For doing good, one needs no thinking over. 
Indeed so often good but leads to evil. 
Distrust alone the good to evil turns. 
Thons:  
Iphigenia: 
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This then is the true Realm of Ends : in it nothing is final 
and conclusive, and again nothing is a mere means to some 
ulterior, final end, but each stage is justified in its own ac- 
tivity as fertile and creative present. Goethe heard in all 
nature what one f a r  greater than Goethe had uttered in the 
language of religion: “ M y  Father worketh hitherto, and I 
work.” Renan interpreted Goethe’s conception of God as 
inexhaustible, creative perfectibility : “a Divinity ever be- 
ing achieved by man’s intelligent endeavor toward perfec- 
tion, by the very trend or  nisus of the universe.” T o  Goethe 
this truth of man’s inexhaustible career was not a mere 
doctrine to  teach: he thought it, he sang it, he lived it out. 
F o r  it has rightly been said that, great as was Goethe’s 
work, his greatest masterpiece was his life. I t  was a life of 
rich and varied culture, the fullest expression of all the mani- 
fold energies, perceptions, emotions, and ideals of the mod- 
ern spirit. But it was far  from a perfect life, nor a con- 
tented life, nor scarcely happy. “I can affirm,” he said in 
1824, “that during the whole of my seventy-five years I have 
not had four weeks of genuine happiness. It is but the per- 
petual rolling of a rock that must be raised up again for- 
ever.” This is Goethe in a depressed moment. I cite him 
here deliberately to gain balance in the portrayal of the 
man. Yet this is not the characteristic note, as Goethe’s 
works witness. I t  was not pain that distressed Goethe, nor 
failure, nor frustration, but rather instability of effort, or 
the hazard of stagnation. 
T h e  gloom of young Arthur Schopenhauer was so intense 
as to cast a gray veil over the gay brilliance of Weimar’s 
social life and to impress ,even benign sages like Wieland. 
But though Goethe was personally attached to Schopen- 
hauer, the young pessimist’s gloom and wails did not im- 
press or upset Goethe’s active serenity. Wiser in his judg- 
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ment was Spinoza, he thought, in his resolution not to abuse 
and ridicule the emotions and actions of men, but to under- 
stand them. So Goethe told Schopenhauer: 
T o  what end should man strive on earth? 
To know the world, not scorn its worth. 
In response to Schopenhauer’s request for a “sentiment” 
in his autograph album, Goethe, in memory of many friendly 
conversations, wrote the following concise judgment on the 
young man’s pessimistic view of life : 
The joy of thine own worth to know, 
Worth to the world thou must bestow. 
This couplet, needless to say, did not convert the philosopher 
of gloom; yet Schopenhauer valued it so highly that he tore 
out all the other leaves in his album and left only Goethe’s 
page in its single dignity. These two couplets are of out- 
standing interest, summing up as they do Goethe’s philoso- 
phy : its theoretical, naturalistic serenity and its practical, 
heroic fruitfulness. T o  these two may I, in closing, add a 
third, likewise a sage counsel to a young pessimist, t o  Adam 
von DOSS, one of Schopenhauer’s disciples : “The good Lord 
has indeed created the nut, but he has not also cracked it.” 
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